Review of "MacArthur in Korea: The Naked Emperor," by Robert Smith
Review of
MacArthur in Korea: The Naked Emperor,
by Robert Smith, ISBN 0671240625
Five out of five stars
El Supremo is truly laid bare
This book truly
lays out Douglas MacArthur as the arrogant, dramatic incompetent that he was. No
less a soldier/politician than Dwight Eisenhower famously said, “I studied
dramatics under Douglas MacArthur for five years in Washington and four years
in the Philippines.” Eisenhower served under MacArthur both times.
Even though it
was clear well before Pearl Harbor that the Japanese had their sights on the
Philippines, MacArthur did little to nothing to prepare for the invasion. In
September 1940, the Japanese took control of French Indochina, they already had
massive forces in China and control of the island of Formosa. A simple look at
a map would make it clear that the American controlled Philippines would pose a
clear danger to these holdings. In fact, there was a consensus in the American
military that the most likely next target of the Japanese forces would be the
Philippines.
After this
disaster, despite significant reservations, MacArthur was made supreme
commander of the Allied counterattack northward from Australia. He was given
command of the Japanese surrender and was then named the commander of the
military occupation of Japan.
It was no fault
of MacArthur’s that the U. S. government considered Korea to be an afterthought
in the overall war strategy. In fact, there were many indications from the
Allied leadership that they really didn’t care a whole lot about Korea.
Smith spares no
opportunity to point out MacArthur’s blunders throughout his time as the
overall commander of U. N. forces in Korea. It was only due to the
extraordinary courage of the soldiers on the ground and some selective ignoring
of orders that kept the U. N. forces from being utterly defeated by the North
Korean and Chinese forces.
Despite a great
deal of historical analysis, the sheer incompetence and brutality of the Korean
War is still unappreciated. One very important point made by Smith is that the
government of South Korea under Syngman Ree was ruthless against anyone in the
country that was deemed an opponent. Ree clearly ordered targeted
assassinations and the wholesale slaughter of villages in order to maintain power.
The sheer incompetence of the American political leadership on the ground is
also covered in detail.
MacArthur’s
biggest blunder of his career was thinking that the Chinese forces would not
intervene in Korea. He ordered U. N. forces to advance to the Yalu River even
though the Chinese were sending unambiguous signals that they would intervene
in force. Even the appearance of Chinese units and Chinese prisoners did
nothing to change his rigid mind. Once again, it was the tenaciousness of the
American soldiers and some brilliant maneuvers in retreat that kept the U. N.
forces from being completely defeated.
While this book
is shorter that other books about the Korean War and traces the MacArthur
legacy back to the Philippines, the evidence for MacArthur’s ineptitude is
overwhelming.
Comments
Post a Comment