Review of "MacArthur in Korea: The Naked Emperor," by Robert Smith

 Review of

MacArthur in Korea: The Naked Emperor, by Robert Smith, ISBN 0671240625

Five out of five stars

El Supremo is truly laid bare

 This book truly lays out Douglas MacArthur as the arrogant, dramatic incompetent that he was. No less a soldier/politician than Dwight Eisenhower famously said, “I studied dramatics under Douglas MacArthur for five years in Washington and four years in the Philippines.” Eisenhower served under MacArthur both times.

 Even though it was clear well before Pearl Harbor that the Japanese had their sights on the Philippines, MacArthur did little to nothing to prepare for the invasion. In September 1940, the Japanese took control of French Indochina, they already had massive forces in China and control of the island of Formosa. A simple look at a map would make it clear that the American controlled Philippines would pose a clear danger to these holdings. In fact, there was a consensus in the American military that the most likely next target of the Japanese forces would be the Philippines.

 After this disaster, despite significant reservations, MacArthur was made supreme commander of the Allied counterattack northward from Australia. He was given command of the Japanese surrender and was then named the commander of the military occupation of Japan.

 It was no fault of MacArthur’s that the U. S. government considered Korea to be an afterthought in the overall war strategy. In fact, there were many indications from the Allied leadership that they really didn’t care a whole lot about Korea.

 Smith spares no opportunity to point out MacArthur’s blunders throughout his time as the overall commander of U. N. forces in Korea. It was only due to the extraordinary courage of the soldiers on the ground and some selective ignoring of orders that kept the U. N. forces from being utterly defeated by the North Korean and Chinese forces.

 Despite a great deal of historical analysis, the sheer incompetence and brutality of the Korean War is still unappreciated. One very important point made by Smith is that the government of South Korea under Syngman Ree was ruthless against anyone in the country that was deemed an opponent. Ree clearly ordered targeted assassinations and the wholesale slaughter of villages in order to maintain power. The sheer incompetence of the American political leadership on the ground is also covered in detail.

 MacArthur’s biggest blunder of his career was thinking that the Chinese forces would not intervene in Korea. He ordered U. N. forces to advance to the Yalu River even though the Chinese were sending unambiguous signals that they would intervene in force. Even the appearance of Chinese units and Chinese prisoners did nothing to change his rigid mind. Once again, it was the tenaciousness of the American soldiers and some brilliant maneuvers in retreat that kept the U. N. forces from being completely defeated.

 While this book is shorter that other books about the Korean War and traces the MacArthur legacy back to the Philippines, the evidence for MacArthur’s ineptitude is overwhelming.

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